In this paper, power control for two-tier small-cell networks in the uplink is investigated. We formulate the power control problem as a Stackelberg game, where the macrocell user equipment (MUE) acts as the leader and the small-cell user equipments (SUEs) as the followers. To reduce the cross-tier and co-tier interference and also the power consumption of both the MUE and SUEs, we propose to impose a set of costs on their transmit powers and optimize not only the transmit rate but also the transmit power. The corresponding optimization problems are solved by two-layer iterations. In the inner iteration, the SUEs compete with each other and their optimal transmit powers are obtained through iterative computations. In the outer iteration, the MUE's optimal transmit power is obtained in a closed form based on the transmit powers of the SUEs through proper mathematical manipulations. We prove the convergence of the proposed power control scheme, and also theoretically show the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) in the formulated Stackelberg game. Simulation results show great improvement of the proposed power control scheme especially for the MUE.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of the global communications industry, the problem of high energy consumption of communications systems becomes more and more serious, and how to effectively improve the energy efficiency of the entire network becomes more and more urgent. The introduction of small-cells can make the energy consumption of the entire network greatly reduced. Furthermore, because small-cells have small cell radiuses with small base stations (SBSs) deployed closer to users and short-distance transmission brings smaller path loss and fading, the throughput of the entire network can be increased. Therefore, the energy efficiency of the entire two-tier small-cell networks, which is composed of macrocells and a large number of small-cells, can be improved to a great extent [1] . In order to improve the spectral efficiency, small-cells can share the spectrum with macrocells, however, the co-tier and cross-tier interference will seriously degrade the system performance due to the sharing of the spectrum. In this regard, proper power control in small-cell networks is required to reduce the interference and the power consumption.
As we know, power control is an important research topic that has been widely investigated in the literature [2] - [8] . In the two-tier small-cell networks, small-cells can be deployed randomly and freely, and game theory was increasingly used to achieve distributed power control [9] . In [10] - [12] , it was showed that Stackelberg game can provide a suitable framework to model the competition in two-tier networks. Specifically, a power control problem was formulated to maximize energy efficiency with minimum information exchange in [10] . In [11] , both uniform and non-uniform pricing schemes were proposed to obtain the optimal resource allocation with a tolerable interference power constraint. In [12] , a network interference controller was proposed to minimize the sum interference by pricing the power consumptions. However, most of the existing literature only addressed power control in the downlink and ignored power control of both small-cell user equipments (SUEs) and macrocell user equipments (MUEs) in the uplink.
Besides, because most of the existing literature addressed power control through price-based Stackelberg game, they can determine the optimal price and power control for only one kind of device. Therefore, if we formulate the power control problem through Stackelberg game without pricing, the optimal power control for two kinds of UEs in the considered two-tier small-cell networks can be determined simultaneously.
Motivated by the aforementioned discussions, we develop a power control scheme taking into account of both SUEs and MUE. First of all, the power control problem of the considered two-tier small-cell networks is mathematically formulated as a Stackelberg game consisting of one leader and multi-followers. Secondly, the optimization problem is solved by two-layer iterations. In the inner iteration, the followers compete with each other, and their optimal transmit powers are obtained through iterative computations. In the outer iteration, the optimal transmit power of the leader is calculated based on the transmit powers of the followers. Then, we theoretically show the convergence of the proposed scheme and the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) in the Stackelberg game. Finally, our proposed power control scheme is verified through simulations, which is shown to greatly improve the performance of the MUE.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system model of the considered two-tier small-cell networks is presented. In Section III, the proposed power control scheme via Stackelberg game is developed. Simulation results are shown in Section IV. Final conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the two-tier small-cell networks as illustrated in Fig. 1 , which consists of one macrocell and K small-cells. Assume that the macro base station (MBS) and SBSs share the same spectrum, and that each UE communicates with only one BS at any time. In the uplink, each SBS will suffer interference from the MUE and its nearby SUEs, and the MBS will suffer interference from its nearby SUEs. Let P 0 denote the transmit power of the MUE served by the MBS, P k the transmit power of the kth SUE,
T the transmit power vector of the considered K SUEs. Then, the transmit rate of the MUE served by the MBS can be expressed as follows,
where H 00 denotes the channel gain from the MUE to its corresponding MBS, H 0k the interference channel gain from the kth SUE to the MBS, and N 0 the noise power. The transmit rate of the SUE served by the kth SBS can be expressed as follows,
where p −k denotes the transmit power vector of the K−1 other SUEs and
, H kk the channel gain from the kth SUE to its corresponding SBS, H k0 the interference channel gain from the MUE to the kth SBS, H kk the interference channel gain from the k th SUE to the kth SBS.
The design objective of this paper is to develop a distributed power control scheme that can Fig. 1 . The schematic of the considered two-tier small-cell networks.
increase the transmit rate with reduced co-tier and cross-tier interference and power consumption.
Moreover, this paper aims to achieve the above design objective for two-tier small-cell networks where there are two kinds of UEs, i.e., MUE and SUE, and two different cell types, i.e., macro cell and small-cell.
III. THE PROPOSED POWER CONTROL SCHEME VIA STACKELBERG GAME
In this section, we propose a power control scheme for the two-tier small-cell networks based on Stackelberg game, where there are one leader and multiple followers. In the formed Stackelberg game, the MUE acting as the leader is supposed to make its own decision and maximize its utility with the best responses of the followers, and the SUEs acting as the followers will respond to the leader's action and maximize their utilities through a non-cooperative subgame [13] - [15] . We remark here that the transmit power of the MUE or SUE is controlled by its corresponding MBS or SBS and that the MBS can control its corresponding SBSs in the considered two-tier small-cell networks. Therefore, the MUE controlled by the MBS acts as the leader, and the SUEs controlled by its corresponding SBSs act as the followers.
A. Stackelberg Game Formulation
From (1) and (2), we can see that the transmit rate of the MUE can be improved by increasing the transmit power of the MUE but at the cost of increased cross-tier interference to the SUEs.
Likewise, the transmit rate of the SUEs can be improved by increasing the transmit power of the corresponding SUE but at the cost of increased cross-tier interference to the MUE and increased co-tier interference to the other K − 1 SUEs. In order to reduce the cross-tier and co-tier interference and also the power consumption of both the MUE and SUEs, we propose to optimize not only the transmit rate but also the power consumption. Firstly, the leader MUE moves and determines its transmit power. Subsequently, the follower SUEs move and update their power control strategies to maximize their individual utilities based on the MUE's transmit power.
We define the utility function of the MUE as follows,
where λ 0 denotes the transmit cost per unit power of the MUE [16] . Then, the optimization problem of the MUE can be expressed as follows,
where P T denotes the maximum transmit power of the MUE or SUEs.
We define the utility function of the kth SUE as follows,
where λ k denotes the transmit cost per unit power of the kth SUE. Then, the optimization problem of the kth SUE can be expressed as follows,
The optimization problems in (4) and (6) lead to a Stackelberg game, in which the objective is to find the SE point from which neither the leader nor the followers have incentives to deviate.
We describe the SE below.
Definition 1: Let P * 0 and P * k denote the two solutions for the optimization problems in (4) and (6), respectively. Let
is an SE point for the proposed Stackelberg game if the following conditions are satisfied,
Generally, we can obtain the SE point for the considered Stackelberg game by finding the Nash equilibrium (NE) of its subgame, and the subgame here is non-cooperative, so the definition of SE is the same as that of NE [11] . To obtain the SE of the proposed Stackelberg game, we propose to exploit the backward induction method [17] to solve the above optimization problems. We remark here that the proposed Stackelberg game is a sequential game, where the leader moves first and the followers reply by optimizing their own utilities given the strategy of the leader. Generally, the followers' best responses can be obtained with the fixed value given by the leader, and then the optimal strategy of the leader can be achieved according to the followers' best responses.
Correspondingly, we can first solve the followers' optimization problem in (6) . Then, by using the obtained solution, we can solve the leader's optimization problem in (4).
B. The Optimal Solution of the Followers' Optimization Problem
For the optimal solution of the optimization problem in (6) for the followers, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Given the transmit power of the MUE, the optimization problem in (6) has a globally optimal solution as follows,
where (·) + ∆ = max(·, 0), and
Proof: It can be readily seen that the utility function U k (P k , p −k , P 0 ) is strictly concave.
Furthermore, it can be verified that the SUEs' strategy space is a non-empty and close-bounded convex set in Euclidean space. Correspondingly, the optimization problem in (6) can be readily proved to be convex. Then, it has a globally optimal solution. By setting the first-order derivative of U k (P k , p −k , P 0 ) with respect to P k to zero, P k can be readily calculated as shown in (11) .
By considering the constraint 0 ≤ P k ≤ P T , the optimal solution of the optimization problem in (6) can be readily obtained as shown in (9) or (10) . This completes the proof.
C. The Optimal Solution of the Leader's Optimization Problem
After some mathematical manipulations, we can obtain the refined constraint for P 0 according to (9) as follows,
where
T . Substitute (10) into (3), and after some mathematical manipulations, we have
= ln
where ε k denotes the indicator function with ε k = 1 if P tmp k > 0 and ε k = 0 otherwise, and ε k the indicator function with ε k = 1 if P T −(P tmp k ) + > 0 and ε k = 0 otherwise. After some further manipulations are carried out, the optimization problem for the leader in (4) can be reformulated as follows, max
Then, we have the following theorem.
ε k ε k = 0, the optimization problem in (19) has an optimal solution as
Proof: If
ε k ε k = 0, then B = 0. Take the first-order derivative of U 0 (P 0 ,p * ) with respect to P 0 . Then, we have
Set the above expression to zero. Then, we have
If C 2 2 − 4C 1 C 3 < 0, then (29) has no solution. Correspondingly, the objective function of the optimization problem in (19) is definitely a monotonic function, and its solution must be one of the two endpoints. Then, we havẽ
If C 2 2 − 4C 1 C 3 ≥ 0, we can obtain the two solutions of (29), i.e., P 1 0 , P 2 0 . Since the objective function of the optimization problem in (19) is a continuous function, its solution must be among the extreme points and the endpoints. Correspondingly, we havẽ
This completes the proof.
Algorithm 1 The Proposed Power Control Scheme via Stackelberg Game
• Step 1: Initialization: m = 1, n = 1, P 0 (1),P k (1) for 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
• Step 2: UpdateP k (m) as follows,
and set m = m + 1.
• Step 3: Repeat the step 2 until the inner iteration converges.
• Step 4: According to (10) , calculate the transmit power of each SUE,P * k , as follows,
•
Step 5: According to (22) , calculate the transmit power of the MUE,P * 0 (n + 1), and set n = n + 1.
• Step 6: Repeat the steps 2 ∼ 5 until the outer iteration converges.
D. The Proposed Power Control Scheme via Stackelberg Game
We are now ready to develop the proposed power control scheme based on the Stackelberg game described in Algorithm 1. In the proposed scheme, the MUE acts as the leader while the SUEs act as the followers, and the Stackelberg game is formed through the two-layer iterations.
In the inner iteration, the SUEs compete with each other, and their own transmit powers are updated iteratively based on the transmit power of the MUE as shown in Theorem 1. In the outer iteration, the MUE updates its own transmit power based on the transmit powers of the SUEs as shown in Theorem 2. In the proposed power control scheme, each user plays the best response strategy, and maximizes its own utility function in each iteration given the chosen transmit powers of the other users in the previous iteration.
Let W denote the K × K matrix whose elements are given by
Then, we can establish the following theorem concerning the convergence of the inner iteration of the proposed scheme.
Theorem 3:
If the matrix norm of W is no larger than 1, i.e., W ≤ 1, the inner iteration of the proposed power control scheme via Stackelberg game as shown in Algorithm 1 converges.
Proof: Define
Then, φ(p) can be expressed in a vector-matrix form as follows
Assume W ≤ 1. Then, we can obtain the following relationship
According to [18] , we know that φ(p) is a contraction. Then, according to the Banach contraction theorem introduced in [18] , φ(p) has a unique fixed point that is globally asymptotically stable.
Correspondingly, the inner iteration of the proposed power control scheme via Stackelberg game as shown in Algorithm 1 converges. This completes the proof.
We remark here that we can always find a matrix norm of W to satisfy W ≤ 1. Therefore, the convergence of the inner iteration of the proposed power control scheme can always be guaranteed.
In the following, we briefly analyze the convergence of the outer iteration of the proposed scheme. We have known that the utility function U k is concave with respect to p k . Therefore, the SUEs can gradually increase their transmit powers from an arbitrary small number to their optima. Then, the transmit power of the SUEs so obtained can be used to determine the transmit power of the MUE. When the transmit powers of the SUEs have been increased to the optima, the optimal transmit power of the MUE can then be determined accordingly [19] . For the practical implementation of the proposed Stackelberg game, the SUEs can find their optimal transmit powers by gradually increasing the transmit power until the utility function U k reaches its maximum due to its concave property. Correspondingly, the MUE can always achieve its SE,
i.e., the convergence of the outer iteration of the proposed scheme can always be guaranteed.
E. The Existence and Uniqueness of the SE
SE offers a predictable and stable outcome about the transmit power strategies that the MUE and each SUE will choose. For the proposed Stackelberg game, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4:
There exists one and only one SE point for the proposed Stackelberg game.
Proof: Generally, we can obtain the SE for the considered Stackelberg game by finding its subgame Nash equilibrium (NE). For the proposed Stackelberg game, there is only one leader.
Therefore, the best response of the leader can be readily obtained by solving the optimization problem in (4) . At the followers' side, it is easy to see that the SUEs strictly compete in a non-cooperative fashion and they formulate a non-cooperative power control subgame. Correspondingly, to prove this theorem, we only need to prove that there exists one NE point for the non-cooperative power control subgame at the followers' side.
It can be verified that the SUEs' strategy space is a non-empty and closed-bounded convex set in the Euclidean space. Besides, it can also be verified that the utility function
is continuous with respect to P k . In addition, the utility function
According to [20] and [21] , we know that the NE exists if the players' strategy space is a non-empty and closed-bounded set in the Euclidean space and the utility function is continuous and concave in its strategy space. Correspondingly, the existence of the non-cooperative power control subgame at the followers' side can be proved.
Regarding the uniqueness of the NE, we first state the lemma below.
Lemma 1: For a game, if its feasible region is convex and each players' utility function is strictly convex, then the NE of the game is unique.
Then, according to the above-mentioned discussions in this proof and the proof of Theorem 1, we can easily verify the uniqueness of the non-cooperative power control subgame at the followers' side.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, the performance of the proposed power control scheme via Stackelberg game is evaluated via simulations. In the simulations, the radiuses of the macrocell and small cells are set to be 1000m and 100m, respectively. The noise spectral density is set to −174dBm/Hz.
Unless otherwise stated, we set λ = λ 0 = λ k , ∀k. In the following, for description convenience, we useŪ K ,R K ,P K to denote the average utility, the average transmit rate, and the average transmit power of the considered SUEs, and we useR to denote the average transmit rate of the considered MUE and SUEs.
In Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 , we show the utility of the MUE and the average utility of the SUEs of the proposed scheme versus the number of iterations with different K for λ = 10 3 and P T = 0dBm.
It can be observed that the proposed scheme can converge to a stable state quickly, which verifies that the proposed scheme can converge to the SE. It can also be observed that both the utility of the MUE and the average utility of the SUEs decrease with the increased number of the SUEs, which can be attributed to the increased cross-tier or co-tier interference.
In Fig. 4 , we show the performance comparison between our proposed scheme and the noncooperative power control scheme in [22] with λ = 10 description convenience, the utility of the MUE and the average utility of the SUEs of the proposed Stackelberg game based power control scheme are referred to as SG-MUE and SG-SUE, respectively. While the utility of the MUE and the average utility of the SUEs of the non-cooperative game based power control scheme in [22] are referred to as NCG-MUE and NCG-SUE, respectively. It can be observed that the SG-MUE is close to and slightly larger than the SG-SUE, and that the NCG-MUE is approximately zero and obviously smaller than the NCG-SUE. This verifies that the proposed scheme can significantly improve the performance of the MUE.
In Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 , we show the transmit rate of the MUE and the average transmit rate of the SUEs of the proposed scheme versus P T with different K for λ = 10 3 . It can be observed that the transmit rate firstly increases with P T when P T is smaller than a certain threshold value, and then goes to a steady value. When P T is small enough, the MUE and the SUEs are constrained by the maximum transmit power. Correspondingly, their transmit rates are relatively small. With the increase of P T , their transmit rates increase due to the larger transmit power constraint.
When P T is larger than a certain threshold value, the transmit power will increase, but it will also cause more interference at the same time. Therefore, both the transmit rate of the MUE and that of the SUEs will stop to increase.
In Fig. 7 , we show the transmit rate of the MUE and the average transmit rate of the SUEs versus P T with different λ 0 and λ K for K = 4. It can be observed that the transmit rate of the MUE (the average transmit rate of the SUEs) is larger when λ 0 (λ K ) is relatively smaller. The reason is that a smaller cost of the transmit power will stimulate the corresponding player to employ a relatively larger transmit power, and then to bring about larger transmit rate.
In Fig. 8 , we show the average transmit rate of the MUE and SUEs of the proposed scheme versus λ for K = 4 and P T = 0dBm. It can be observed that the average transmit rate remains a high value when λ is smaller than 30dB, decreases gradually with the increased λ, and finally remains a small value. The reason is that the MUE or SUE will choose to decrease the transmit Fig. 8 . The average transmit rate versus λ with different K.
power and also the corresponding transmit rate with the increased λ.
In Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 , we show the transmit power of the MUE and the average transmit power of the SUEs versus P T with different λ for K = 4. It can be observed that the transmit power decreases with λ. It can also be observed that the transmit power increases with P T when P T is smaller than 0dBm, and remains approximately constant when P T is larger than 0dBm.
The reason is that the maximum transmit power constraint will have no influence on the power control with a sufficiently large P T .
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have formulated a power control Stackelberg game for the two-tier smallcell networks by considering both the transmit rate and cost. The optimal transmit powers of the MUE and SUEs have been obtained based on the backward induction method. We have developed a two-layer iterative power control scheme and proved the convergence of this scheme.
We have also shown the existence and uniqueness of the SE in the formulated Stackelberg game. Numerical results have been presented to demonstrate the desirable performance of the proposed scheme. For the future work, we would like to explore power control with incomplete information by considering that complete information has been used in our proposed scheme.
